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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. M. CASTLE AND COl\'lP ANY 
A Corpora ti on, 
and Respondent, 
vs. 
H. G. BAGLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11828 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The case on appeal involves an action by Plaintiff 
A. l\'I. Castle and Company (Pacific Metals Division), 
hereinafter called "Pacific Metals", against defendant. 
H. G. Bagley, hereinafter called "Bagley", to reform 
a promissory note and enforce it against him. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, (Judge Leonard M. Elton) granted judgment 
in favor of Pacific Metals against Bagley by reforming 
the note to include in the body thereof the amount of 
"Two Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Three and 
25/100 Dollars" and awarded judgment to Pacific 
Metals in the sum of $2,660.13 and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment of 
the lower court in favor of Pacific Metals. 
OF FACTS 
Between approximately March 3, 1966 and May 
12, 1966, upon the order of Bagley as an employee of 
General Metals Company (not a party to the action) , 
Pacific Metals sold steel of the value of $7 47. 71 to 
General Metals Company, a corporation (R. 34, 35, 37, 
41, 44, Plaintiff's Ex. I, 4). 
Since about May 20, 1966 or prior thereto, Bagley 
had a contract with persons not parties to this action 
to purchase a 50% stock interest in General Metals 
Company (R. 59). The business of General Metals 
Company had failed and Bagley lost money and under-
took to wind up General Metals Company's business 
by collecting its accounts receivable, furnishing some 
2 
-
additional materials on contracts already in process and 
by other handling ( R. 58, 59, 60, 63, 82). 
Pacific Metals employed Bagley between .May 
1966 and September 1967 (R. 34, 81). 
Pacific Metals received Bagley' s oral promises to 
personally pay the old bill of $747.71 accrued by Gen-
eral Metals Company and future amounts incurred 
covering the price of merchandise to be ordered by 
Bagley in finishing outstanding contracts of General 
Metals Company (R. 44, 45, 62, 63, 92, 93). 
Between May 20, 1966 and September 13, 1966, 
Pacific Metals furnished further steel of the value of 
$1,545.54 upon order of Bagley, which was charged 
on the General Metals account (R. 44 and Plaintiff's 
Ex. 1 and 4). 
Prior to May 20, 1966, Pacific Metals knew that 
General Metals Company was defunct_Ator some ac-
counts receivable and uncompleted orders and did not 
sue General Metals Company (R. 63, 94). 
On April 28, 1967, (while an employee of Pacific 
Metals), Bagley executed the subject promissory note 
without objection or comment in the presence of Mr. K. 
L. "\Villiams, Assistant Manager of Pacific Metals, and 
its attorney (R. 42, 43, 56, 57). Mr. Williams testified 
that the promissory note was made out by its attorneys 
in their offices, excepting as to the date and the amount 
in words and figures, that Mr. Williams of Pacific 
l\Ietals instructed a typist in his office just prior to 
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the time Bagley signed the note on April 28, 1967 to 
insert the amount of $2,293.25 in words and figures 
in the note as well as the date of April 28, 1967 (R. 
42, 43); that the secretary inserted the date of April 
28, 1967 and the figure of $2,293.25 in the upper left 
hand corner of the note, but through clerical inadver-
tence, error and mistake, failed to insert the words 
"Two Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Three and 
25/100 Dollars" in the body of the note. The testimony 
of Mr. Williams is that the parties mutually intended 
to execute a valid and complete note contracting for 
payment by defendant of the specific obligation under 
the General Metals account of $2,293.25 and that the 
note admitted into evidence was exactly the same as it 
was at the time it was signed by defendant on the date 
it bears, in the presence of Mr. Williams and his at-
torney (R. 42, 43). 
Bagley admits signing the note but claims he did 
not intend to be bound to personal liability, and that 
he signed as a "facetious act". (R. 43, 44, 57, 75, 76). 
The evidence in this case was that the subject note 
did not pay General Metals Company's bill of $2,293.25, 
but was given and accepted as security for the pay-
ment of General Metals obligation. Bagley had pre-
viously indicated that he would give Pacific Metals 
security for said indebtedness of $2,293.25 in the form 
of an assignment of the uniform real estate contract 
under which Bagley and his wife were purchasing their 
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residence ( R. 44, 45, 46, 82, Plaintiff's Ex. 3) . How-
ever, this assignment was never obtained. 
After the maturity of the note Bagley refused to 
pay the obligation and Pacific Metals brought this 
action to reform the note to include the words "Two 
Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Three and 25/100" 
in the body thereof and to enforce the note against 
Bagley as his personal obligation. 
Bagley collected some of the accounts- receivable 
and used some of the proceeds ($1,109.15) to pay salary 
to himself as an agent or employee of General Metals 
( R. 73, 84) . Plaintiff's Exh. 53) . 
ARG UJ\'IENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RE-
FORMED THE SUBJECT INSTRUMENT 
AND THEREBY :MADE THE AMOUNT CER-
TAIN AND THE INSTRUMENT ENFORCE-
ABLE. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads: 
"70A-3-ll5. Incomplete instruments. - (1) 
When a paper whose contents at the time of sign-
ing show that it is intended to become an instru-
ment is signed while still incomplete in any 
necessary respect it cannot been enforced until 
completed, but when it is completed in accord-
ance with authority given it is effective as com-
pleted." 
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The trial court specifically found as fact ( R. 27) 
that an omission in the body of the note of the words 
"Two Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Three and 
25/100 Dollars" had been made by clerical error and 
that 
" . at the time of signing plaintiff and de-
fendant mutually intended that this personal 
note be executed by defendant as a valid and 
complete instrument to secure payment by de-
fendant personally of the specific obligation of 
$2,293.25 charged to the General Metals Com-
pany account." 
Based upon this finding of mutual intent and mis-
take, the trial court ordered the note reformed to in-
clude the missing words in the body thereof ( R. 28) . 
It is noted that the testimony which the trial court be-
lieved was that the figure of "$2,293.25" appeared on 
the upper left hand corner of the note at the time it 
was signed by Bagley (R. 42, 43). The Record contains 
ample evidence to support the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. 
45 Am. Jur., p. 596 provides: 
"Section 25. - Negotiable Instruments - The 
general equity jurisdiction to reform written in-
struments so that they will express the true agree-
ment of the parties extends to negotiable instru-
ments such as bills of exchange, and promissory 
notes (citing cases)." 
45 Am. J ur., p. 601, et. seq. provides: 
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"III. Defects Correctible. 
34. Generally. - In general, a writ-
ten mstrument may be reformed as to any ma-
terial defect, whether it is in regard to a com-
mon-law or statutory requisite. . . . So also, 
although there is some authority to the contrary, 
the court may supply omitted provisions, whether 
the omission was due to mutual mistake, or was 
the result of a mistake of one of the parties 
accompanied by the fraud or inequitable conduct 
of the other, although, of course, intentional 
omissions will not be supplied (citing cases) 
" 
POINT II 
CONSIDERATION WAS NOT NECESSARY 
WHERE THE SUBJECT NOTE WAS GIVEN 
AS SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF AN 
ANTECEDENT DEBT, BUT ADEQUATE 
CONSIDERATION WAS PRESENT IN THIS 
CASE. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES 
NOT ASSIST APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended reads: 
"70A-3-408. Consideration. Want or failure 
of consideration is a defense as against any per-
son not having the rights of a holder in due course 
(Section 70A-3-305), except that no considera-
tion is necessary for an instrument or obligation 
thereon given in payment of or as security for 
an antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing 
in this section shall be taken to displace any 
statute outside this act under which a promise 
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is enforceable notwithstanding lack or failure 
of consideration. Partial failure of consideration 
is a defense pro tan to whether or not the failure 
is in an ascertained or liquidated amount." 
Particular attention is directed to the wording of 
70A-3-408. 
" ... except that no consideration is necessary 
for an instrument or obligation thereon given in 
payment of or as security for an antecedent obli-
gation of any kind." (Italics ours) . 
Respondent contends this provision covers assump-
tion of an antecedent obligation of a third party (italics 
ours) as well as assumption of an antecedent obligation 
of the maker of a note. 
Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 1, 
page 644, 1961 Edn., provides: 
"3-408 :1. Offiical Code Comment. 
"Purposes of Changes: 
"l ... 
"2. The "except" clause is intended to remove 
the difficulties which have arisen where a note 
or a draft, or an endorsement of either, is given 
as payment or as security for a debt already 
owed by the party giving it, or by a third person 
. . . " (Italics ours) . 
Respondent contends that no requirement of con-
sideration exists in that the subject promissory note was 
executed by Bagley for the purpose of securing pay-
ment of the antecedent debt of General Metals Com-
8 
pany and the new purchases ordered by Bagley which 
were charged on the General Metals Company account. 
--Consideration did exist in this case in that Pacific 
Metals furnished additional merchandise on order of 
Bagley; Pacific Metals employed Bagley - (Bagley 
was employed by Pacific Metals at the time he executed 
the note); Pacific Metals relied upon Bagley's prom-
ises to give a personal note and upon the note when 
given as Bagley' s personal obligation and did not sue 
General lVIetals Company (Bagley had a contract to 
purchase 50% of General Metals stock) . 
Appellant on pages I, 2 and under Point II of 
his brief at page 5 seems to imply that the Statute of 
Frauds was asserted at trial to bar plaintiff from at-
tempting to hold defendant for the antecedent debt 
of another, or that the Supreme Court should consider 
the Statute in aid of appellant. 
The defense of the Statute is required under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953, as amended, Rule 
8 ( c) , to be pleaded as an affirmative defense. This 
was not done in this case and appellant is not entitled 
to raise the question on appeal. 
Respondent contends that the subject promissory 
note subscribed by Bagley is a writing which, when 
coupled with plaintiff's exhibits I and 4, would con-
stitute writings sufficient to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds. 
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See Corbin on Contracts, 1950 Edition, Vol. 2, page 
732-33-34, which reads: 
."Section 508. Character of writings that con-
tam the memorandum . . . Promissory notes, 
checks, and bonds ordinarily do not express the 
terms of an but may be used to sup-
plement other wr1tmgs. When they do indicate 
the terms of the contract they may themselves 
a sufficient memorandum (citing 
cases). 
POINT III 
THE SIGNATURE OF DEFENDANT 
DOES APPEAR ON THE SUBJECT NOTE 
AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
AWARDING JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE 
NOTE. 
Bagley' s testimony with respect to his signature on 
the note which he signed was characterized variously 
by him as a "facetious" act; to get Pacific Metals "off 
my neck"; not as his real signature intended to bin<l 
him personally; as a signature to bind General Metals 
Co., a corporation; as a meaningless signature on a 
piece of paper of which he did not know the legal effect; 
as a signature that he made while secretly observing 
an omission of the amount in the body of the note with-
out bringing his observation to anyone's attention. 
Such testimony is incredulous. All of the evidence 
and the exhibits clearly establish the signature as that 
of Bagley and the trial court so found indicating that 
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Bagley intended by the signature to create personal 
liability. Promising to execute an assignment of his 
equity in a real estate contract on his residence as secur-
ity for payment and furnishing a copy of said contract 
to Pacific Metals' attorney (Exh. 5) indicates that he 
regarded the note as a personal undertaking, even 
though the assignment did not materialize. Other docu-
ments ( P. Exhs. 4 & 5) bear Bagley' s signature or 
initials for comparison of signatures. 
Respondent respectfully suggests that the points 
asserted herein and the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law filed by the trial court ( R. 27, 28) are amply 
supported by the evidence after full trial of the issues 
and the Supreme Court should review the evidence and 
the reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings 
and judgment. Newton vs. State Road Commission 
(Utah Supreme Court No. 11465 filed January 6, 
1970). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record in this case and upon the 
authorities cited, respondent A. M. Castle and Com-
pany (Pacfic Metals Division), respectfully prays that 
this court affirm the judgment entered in the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GREENWOOD AND MESERVY and 
E. EARL GREENWOOD, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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